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ABSTRACT: This essay examines the strategies that Berkeley and Dharmakīrti utilize to 
deny that idealism entails solipsism. Beginning from similar arguments for the non-existence 
of matter, the two philosophers employ markedly different strategies for establishing the 
existence of other minds. This difference stems from their responses to the problem of 
intersubjective agreement. While Berkeley’s reliance on his Cartesian inheritance does allow 
him to account for intersubjective agreement without descending into solipsism, it 
nevertheless prevents him from establishing the existence of other finite minds. I argue that 
Dharmakīrti, in accounting for intersubjective agreement causally, is able to avoid 
Berkeley’s shortcoming. I conclude by considering a challenge to Dharmakīrti’s use of 
inference that Ratnakīrti, a Buddhist successor of Dharmakīrti, advances in his “Disproof of 
the Existence of Other Minds” and briefly exploring a possible response that someone who 
wants to advocate an idealist position could give. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: IDEALISM AND SOLIPSISM 
 
Ever since Descartes (at least) in the West, and for far longer in India, philosophers 
have entertained the possibility that the whole world is illusory, our experience of an 
external world merely the result of delusion. As fun as it can be to entertain this 
notion in films and introductory philosophy classes, however, and despite a plethora 
of sophisticated defenses of it in Western and Eastern philosophical traditions alike, 
idealism is a difficult position to genuinely and consistently subscribe to. Aside from 
simply being counterintuitive, one of the primary challenges to idealism is the 
apparent implication from idealism to solipsism. Descartes, of course, saw this. The 
whole point of continuing beyond the Second Meditation is to avoid solipsism: 
 
If the objective reality of any of my ideas turns out to be so great that I am sure the same 
reality does not reside in me, either formally or eminently, and hence that I myself cannot 
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be its cause, it will necessarily follow that I am not alone in the world, but that some 
other thing which is the cause of this idea also exists. But if no such idea is to be found in 
me, I shall have no argument to convince me of the existence of anything apart from 
myself. (Descartes (1641/1984), p. 29; emphasis added)  
 
I take it for granted, as did Descartes, that solipsism is an unacceptable philosophical  
position. In fact, if Wittgenstein’s argument against private languages is correct, then 
solipsism is not just objectionable but actually incoherent. The Private Language 
Argument indicates that, if I were alone in the universe, language would be 
impossible and I would thus be unable to even formulate the question of whether I 
were alone in the universe.   
If solipsism is untenable, then if it can be established that idealism leads to 
solipsism, it follows that idealism, too, is untenable. There are at least two reasons to 
believe that idealism entails solipsism. First is the problem of intersubjective 
agreement.  If everything is mind, and all anyone can perceive is his or her own ideas, 
then how do you and I come to agree not only that, say, there is a tree in front of us, 
but even in our descriptions of that tree? A realist will press this issue because 
solipsism seems to be the only recourse for the idealist to respond to the problem of 
intersubjective agreement: “we” agree because what I take to be “you” is just another 
idea in my mind.   
The second reason to believe that idealism entails solipsism involves the principle 
of parsimony. Arguments in favor of idealism typically rely on the premise that all of 
our experience can be explained—and indeed explained better—without reference to 
or reliance on an external world, and on the principle that whatever is found 
unnecessary in accounting for our experience ought not be posited to exist. But the 
principle of parsimony, in doing away with material substance, seems to be no less 
ruthless with other minds. My experience of the so-called external world seems to be 
the only basis for my belief in the existence of anything beyond myself and my 
perceptions. So if I can be made to doubt the existence of the physical body I see 
directly in front of me, then how much more dubious must be the notion of an 
unperceived mind that motivates that non-existent body? If I have no reason to 
believe in the independent existence of those objects that I perceive to lie outside my 
body—indeed, no reason to believe even in the existence of my body—then I have no 
grounds on which to justify a belief in the existence of minds, of which I have even 
less alleged experience. If all I can know are the modifications of my own mind, then 
just as the principle of parsimony demands that we eliminate material substance from 
our ontology once we have shown it to be unnecessary, so too does it demand that I 
eliminate any notion of other mind from my own ontology: one stream of subjective 
consciousness is enough to explain all experienced phenomena—including those that 
themselves are allegedly experiencing phenomena. 
Neither of these concerns relies on a particular (Western or non-Western) way of 
framing the issue. Given the abundance of philosophers who have advocated 
idealism, we should expect to find that such philosophers have challenged either the 
view that solipsism is problematic or the view that idealism entails solipsism. The 
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majority, perhaps not surprisingly, have opted for the latter. In the remainder of this 
essay, I will examine how Berkeley, the most prominent of early-modern idealists, 
and Dharmakīrti, who among Yogācārins put forward the most detailed argument for 
the existence of other minds, attempt to establish the co-possibility of idealism and 
knowledge of other minds. Beginning from quite similar arguments for the non-
existence of matter, the two philosophers employ rather different strategies for 
establishing the existence of other minds. This difference stems, among other things, 
from their responses to the problem of intersubjective agreement. Berkeley’s reliance 
on his Cartesian inheritance allows him to account for intersubjective agreement 
without descending into solipsism, but it prevents him from establishing the existence 
of other finite minds. Dharmakīrti, in accounting for intersubjective agreement 
causally, is able to avoid Berkeley’s limitation. But, as we will see in the conclusion 
of this essay, a new objection awaits Dharmakīrti. And this objection, coming as it 
does from a fellow idealist, proves to be much less easily dispatched.  This final 
objection, I contend, can be useful in pointing out to idealists—Buddhist and non-
Buddhist alike—an important direction to take the discussion in order to finally put 
down for good the solipsism objection. 
 
2. BERKELEY AND OTHER MINDS 
 
In A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge Berkeley argues from 
the empiricist premise that ideas are the only possible objects of knowledge to the 
conclusion that there exists no material world. His argument for idealism involves 
three steps. The first step is to establish that a material world, if any such world were 
to exist, is not a possible object of knowledge. It is the nature of ideas, according to 
Berkeley, to be perceived. As such, they are inert, wholly passive. But the idea of a 
material world is the idea of a world of objects that are capable of acting as causes—
as causes of our ideas of those objects, at the very least. This common-sense 
conception of the world is one in which our ideas resemble the objects that cause 
them. But common sense, according to Berkeley, is greatly mistaken, for “an idea can 
be like nothing but an idea” (1710/1998a, p. 105). It is as incoherent to claim that an 
idea can resemble a material object as it is to claim that a smell can resemble a 
shape—they are wholly incommensurate sorts of things. If all we can know are ideas, 
and if ideas cannot be of a material world, then there can be no knowledge of a 
material world. 
The second step in Berkeley’s argument for idealism involves establishing that a 
material world is not necessary in order to explain our seeming experience of one. He 
uses the classic example of “dreams, frenzies, and the like” as evidence that, while 
our ideas can only be caused by some sort of substance, it need not be material 
substance: “[I]t is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now, 
though no bodies existed without, resembling them” (Berkeley, 1710/1998a, p. 109). 
The Crux of Berkeley’s argument for idealism, though, is the third step, wherein 
he seeks to establish that a material world is not only unnecessary but indeed 
incoherent. He challenges the reader:  
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if you can but conceive it possible for one extended movable substance, or in general, for 
any one idea or anything like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I 
shall readily give up the cause…I shall grant you its existence, though you cannot either 
give me any reason why you believe it exists, or assign any use to it when it is supposed 
to exist. (Berkeley, 1710/1998a, p. 110) 
 
He explains in the next paragraph why such a challenge cannot possibly be met: 
meeting it would entail thinking of an object unthought-of, or conceiving of an object 
unconceived-of—“which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost to 
conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our 
own ideas” (Berkeley, 1710/1998a, p. 111). The incoherence of the concept of 
material substance being thus established, Berkeley concludes that the only rational 
option is to adopt idealism as our standpoint: “it remains therefore that the cause of 
ideas is an incorporeal active substance or spirit” (Berkeley, 1710/1998a, p. 112). 
This is the point in Berkeley’s argument at which the spectre of solipsism appears. 
The very arguments that he used to demonstrate that one can have no grounds for 
belief in a physical world seem also to imply that one can have no grounds for belief 
in any spirit—or mind—other than one’s own.  Berkeley argues that the notion of 
spirit comes from direct intuition of one’s own status as experiencer. In his Three 
Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous Berkeley explains how it is that we can be 
aware of the existence of spirit despite the impossibility of a corresponding idea. 
Speaking in the voice of Philonous, in the Third Dialogue he makes the point that 
perception—which gives rise to ideas—is just one of the three permissible grounds 
for belief (Berkeley, 1713/1998a, pp. 115-117). We can defensibly believe in 
something of which we have no idea if we have a direct intuition of that thing or if the 
existence of that thing is a necessary presupposition for or consequence of something 
that we do know (that is, if it can be directly experienced or logically inferred from 
direct experience). Spirit is thus rendered unproblematic, as every idea we experience 
carries with it a direct intuition of the spirit that is the experiencer of that idea. 
Awareness of one’s own mind, coming as it does through direct intuition, cannot be 
called knowledge because it does not lead to an idea of mind; it does, however, lead 
to what Berkeley calls a notion of mind.
1
 But, since we do not have direct intuition of 
other spirits, belief in the existence of other minds seems to be no more justified than 
belief in the physical world. Berkeley’s solution to this problem is that belief in other 
minds can be justified through inference.  
In the beginning of the Treatise Berkeley states that ideas can arise through sense-
experience, the passions, or imagination (including memory) (1710/1998a, p. 103). 
His inference to the existence of other minds begins from the recognition that our 
experiences of the different sorts of ideas are themselves qualitatively different. 
                                                 
1
 Berkeley’s insistence that awareness of one’s own mind is not knowledge is interestingly similar to 
Wittgenstein’s dictum in the Philosophical Investigations (§246) that knowledge of one’s own pain 
makes no sense—that such a claim betrays a failure to understand what we normally mean in our use 
of the word ‘knowledge’. ‘Knowledge’ makes sense only within the context of the possibility for error. 
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Whereas the ideas of memory and imagination that I experience are wholly subject to 
my will, my sense-experiences are not similarly compliant:  
 
But whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually 
perceived by sense have not a like dependence on my will.  When in broad daylight I 
open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or not, or to determine 
what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the 
hearing and other senses, the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will.  There 
is therefore some other will or spirit that produces them. (Berkeley, 1710/1998a, 113) 
 
My experience of ideas that do not find their cause in my mind is not, for Berkeley, a 
refutation of the thesis that all ideas have their origin in mind (and so a rejection of 
idealism); rather, it is a confirmation that mine is not the only mind. While I have no 
direct intuition of others’ minds, I do have sense-experience of actions that reveal the 
workings of a mind, which themselves form the basis of a valid inference to the 
existence of a mind as the volition behind the action. My further recognition that 
these volitional actions are not subject to my own will reveals to me the existence of a 
will other than my own. I thus come by my notion of other mind in addition to my 
notion of my own mind.
2
 As Anita Avramides points out, despite many 
commentators’ arguments to the contrary, this is not an argument by analogy a la 
Mill. Rather, this is a causal argument, taking the following form: 
 
P1: All ideas are caused by some mind. 
P2:  I experience ideas that are independent of my will. 
P3:  Ideas that are independent of my will must be caused by a mind other than 
my own. 
C1:  Therefore, a mind other than my own exists. 
 
Having thus explained the difference between our different sorts of ideas, 
Berkeley is in a position to address the realist’s concern regarding intersubjective 
agreement. Given the passivity of perception—as opposed to the activity of 
imagination—it makes sense that other people too will find their ideas of sense to be 
independent of their will. Ideas of sense thus being imposed on our experience, it is 
not surprising that different people’s reports of sense-experience agree with one 
another in a way that their reports of those mental states that are subject to an 
individual’s will do not.  But given the conclusion, already established by this point, 
that all ideas are caused by mind, Berkeley must give an account of the sort of mind 
                                                 
2
 Cf. Also what he says in paragraph 145 (1710/1998a, p. 157). Berkeley is subject to a biting criticism 
here: what if, in considering my ideas to be unchosen by my will, I have deceived myself? The 
paradigm case of this is, of course, dreams, but one could argue that addicts deceive themselves when 
they claim that their cravings come unbidden. It is interesting to note that, though he twice mentions 
dreams (paragraphs 18 and 42) in support of his idealist thesis, Berkeley does not seem to have 
considered the possibility that dreams could pose a counterexample, calling into question the validity 
of this inference. I will more fully examine the dream objection below, in the context of Dharmakīrti’s 
response to it. 
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that would be necessary to explain the seemingly independent existence of sense-
ideas. Clearly, the mind that is the source of such ideas must be qualitatively different 
from a human mind.  The ideas of imagination that people experience 
 
are faint, weak, and unsteady in respect of others they perceive by sense, which being 
impressed upon them according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak themselves the 
effects of a mind more powerful and wise than human spirits. (Berkeley, 1710/1998a, p. 
115) 
 
For Berkeley, then, intersubjective agreement and the stability of an individual’s 
sense-ideas are intertwined—and neither presents a difficulty that the idealist cannot 
respond to. Our sense-ideas are stable and a matter of intersubjective agreement 
because our ideas of sense are caused by God: an infinite mind that keeps everything 
in existence by being a perpetual perceiver. 
To summarize: for Berkeley, intersubjective agreement blocks the inference from 
idealism to solipsism, rather than demanding it. Intersubjective agreement is a result 
of our sense ideas being more stable than our imagination-based ideas, and this itself 
is a result of the existence of a qualitatively different mind. The principle of 
parsimony thus does not demand an inference from idealism to solipsism. Once it has 
done away with the material world, it in fact demands the existence of another mind 
to explain our experiences: the mind of God. 
At this point Berkeley is subject to a critical objection: insofar as he succeeds at 
proving the existence of God, he seems to eliminate any reason for believing in other 
finite minds. With God as a sufficient cause of all my ideas, I no longer find myself in 
a position to infer distinct individual minds motivating the representations I have of 
my spouse and my child—both are merely aspects of God’s universal mind.3 If this 
objection succeeds, then Berkeley may have avoided solipsism, but with the result of 
existing alone in the universe with God. Such a prospect is little, if at all, more 
appealing than solipsism.   
Berkeley’s reply to this objection calls to mind Descartes. It is the uniformity of 
experience, he points out, that makes the benefit—and even the maintenance—of life 
possible: “And without this we should be eternally at a loss: we could not know how 
to act anything that might procure us the least pleasure, or remove the least pain of 
sense” (Berkeley, 1710/1998a, p. 113). The intra- and interpersonal regularity of 
sense-ideas, which are not subject to one’s own will, Berkeley takes to be a mark of 
the benevolence of the will that is their author. And once we can be confident in the 
existence of a benevolent God, we have no reason to assume that our belief in other 
minds is a result of deception.   
But it is not at all clear that this response does succeed. Berkeley is correct that 
the regularity of experience is a necessary condition for the maintenance of life, but 
from this we cannot infer a benevolent God at all: all Berkeley is justified in inferring 
from the stability of our sense-ideas is a mind that wants us to have experience that is 
                                                 
3
 This objection is posed by Jonathan Bennett. Avramides (2001, p. 125-130) makes considerable use 
of it in her explication of Berkeley, and I am following her analysis. 
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coherently enough ordered to be called experience at all.  But since the author of our 
sense-ideas could well have the maximization of pain and misery as a goal, this could 
be a mark of malevolence just as easily as it could be of benevolence. All we need to 
do to see the truth of this is to consider the case of torture. On the assumption that 
one’s purpose is to maximize the pain and suffering of another, the primary objective 
must be to keep that person alive and lucid enough to experience suffering. And 
cultivating in that person a belief in the existence of loved ones, who themselves can 
seem to suffer or cause suffering in the subject through various other means, is 
certainly a powerful tool for increasing the experience of suffering.  
Berkeley’s argument for the existence of other finite minds hinges on the ability 
to infer God’s benevolence from the orderliness of one’s experience. This inference 
fails. Thus Berkeley seems to be unwittingly committed, if not to solipsism, then to 
the belief that in addition to oneself only God exists. His contention (1710/1998a, p. 
158) that we have even greater ground for belief in God than in the existence of other 
finite minds is thus true, but in a way that he never intended.  
The medieval Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti is as concerned as Berkeley is to 
show that idealism does not entail solipsism. Dharmakīrti’s response to the problem 
of intersubjective agreement differs markedly from Berkeley’s, however; this 
difference saves him from the concerns that plague Berkeley’s account. Let us turn 
now to Dharmakīrti’s arguments. 
 
3. DHARMAKIRTI AND OTHER STREAMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
As a member of the Yogācāra school of Buddhism, Dharmakīrti inherits arguments 
for idealism that are similar to the arguments we have already seen from Berkeley. 
Vasubandhu’s Twenty Verses (Vimśatikā), for instance, makes use of dreams and 
cases of perceptual error (eye-diseases, illusions) to show that all our experiences can 
be explained without reference to physical causes. Among Dharmakīrti’s unique 
contributions is the argument from constant co-cognition (sahopalambhaniyama), 
which anticipates by more than a millenium Berkeley’s argument for idealism. In the 
Pramānavārttika Dharmakīrti points out that, for any two objects, if they are distinct 
then they will be available in isolation from one another. But blue, for instance, is 
never found in isolation from awareness of blue. It follows, then, that blue and 
awareness of blue are non-distinct. Since the same deduction can be made with regard 
to any object or property—a pot is never found distinct from awareness of the pot, 
heat is never found distinct from awareness of heat, etc.—we are left to conclude that 
the world consists in nothing more than various states of awareness. Anything that I 
take to be an external object is nothing more than my mental state. 
Dharmakīrti’s argument for idealism, then, is quite similar to Berkeley’s argument 
for the incoherence of extended matter. But despite the similarity in starting points, 
Dharmakīrti’s idealism takes on a significantly different feel from Berkeley’s. In his 
Proof of the Existence of Other Streams of Consciousness (Santānāntarasiddhi; 
hereafter Proof), Dharmakīrti provides what is perhaps still the most extensive 
argument that idealism does not imply solipsism that has yet been advanced.  He 
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argues for an inference to the existence of other streams of consciousness
4
 that is 
similar to what Berkeley advocates, but he stops short of concluding the existence of 
God. Instead he provides a causal account of intersubjective agreement that is unlike 
anything we find in Berkeley. In this section I will argue that this move saves 
Dharmakīrti from Berkeley’s fate and thus, if his inference to other streams of 
consciousness works, then Dharmakīrti shows idealism not to lead to solipsism in a 
more tenable way than does Berkeley. 
Much of Dharmakīrti’s argument amounts to demonstrating that knowledge of 
other streams of consciousness is no more problematic for the idealist than for the 
realist because they use the same method. The realist will agree with the idealist that 
we have no direct perception (pratyakṣa) of others’ mental states, and thus that any 
knowledge we can have must come by means of inference (anumāna). The realist, 
believing that extended objects exist in an external world, infers the existence of the 
mental from physical evidence. The only difference from this account for the idealist 
is that idealists understand the evidence to be a mental representation of a physical 
act, rather than the physical act itself. But, Dharmakīrti points out, this does not 
indicate a difference at all, because the realist makes precisely the same inference: 
idealists and realists alike infer the existence of other minds from mental 
representations of actions, not from actions themselves. To prove this, he asks 
whether we come to cognize another’s consciousness from the mere existence of 
action, or only from the actual perception of that action. Clearly the mere existence is 
not sufficient, otherwise everyone would have knowledge of all other 
consciousnesses. Thus the inference is not from the action, but from one’s 
perception—that is, mental representation—of actions and speech. We only know that 
our mental representations are caused by another consciousness; we can say nothing 
about acts in themselves (Dharmakīrti, 1969, Verses 40-47). 
For Dharmakīrti, then, idealism does not entail solipsism any more than realism 
entails solipsism: both the idealist and the realist infer the existence of other streams 
of consciousness from the experience of volitional actions that do not originate within 
one’s own stream of consciousness. It remains to establish exactly how, according to 
Dharmakīrti, that inference proceeds. He says that all volitional actions—such as 
speech and other movements that reveal intentionality—have their origin in 
consciousness. Those volitional actions that I experience subjectively as originating 
from within provide a confirmation of this: my actions reveal my intentions, and my 
lack of action reveals a corresponding lack of intention. The subjectively-experienced 
actions also provide an example of how volitional actions manifest, which helps me 
to recognize those volitional actions that I experience objectively (that is, as 
                                                 
4
 Being a Buddhist, Dharmakīrti of course does not believe in the existence of “minds” per se. In 
denying the existence of the ātman, the Buddhist denies that there is an irreducible subject of 
experience that has privileged epistemic status—something that Berkeley, due to his Cartesian 
inheritance, takes for granted.  Nevertheless, what Berkeley wants to call “mind, spirit, soul, or my 
self” the Buddhist will call a “santāna” or “stream of consciousness”, thereby acknowledging the 
perceived unity of an individual life while denying any unchanging substance that underlies this 
perceived unity.   
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originating from without) as volitional, despite the phenomenological difference in 
how they are experienced.  
The difference between subjectively and objectively experienced volitional 
actions amounts to a difference between experience and non-experience of the 
causally efficacious mental states that lead to the action. Objectively experienced 
volitional actions are those that I cannot find the cause of within my own stream of 
consciousness. Knowing that if they had their cause within me I would be aware of it, 
I conclude that such actions have their cause outside my own consciousness. Having 
established that all volitional actions are similar in having their origin in 
consciousness, and that objectively-experienced volitional actions differ from 
subjectively-experienced ones by virtue of not having their origin in my 
consciousness, the conclusion follows that objectively-experienced volitional actions 
have their origin in another consciousness—which means, of course, that another 
consciousness exists. Thus, Dharmakīrti concludes, the idealist is able to infer the 
existence of other streams of consciousness: “Between the concept of mind in general 
and that of its external manifestations in movements and speech, there is a causal 
relation, and on the basis of the effect, we shall cognize the cause” (1969, Verse 48). 
Dharmakīrti’s argument for the existence of other streams of consciousness, then, 
takes the following form: 
 
P4: I experience actions of a certain type.
5
 
P5: Actions of this certain type have their cause in consciousness. 
P6: These actions do not have their cause in my consciousness. 
C2: Therefore, these actions have their cause in another consciousness. 
C3: Therefore, consciousnesses other than mine exist. 
 
Like Berkeley, Dharmakīrti argues that awareness of other minds can be justified 
through logical implication. However, Dharmakīrti would not agree with Berkeley 
that the differences between our sense-ideas and our other ideas—which differences 
explain the phenomenon of intersubjective agreement—give proof of a qualitatively 
different sort of consciousness as their cause. Instead, Dharmakīrti shows that 
intersubjective agreement can be explained causally even among a community of 
finite minds. People’s reports of the “external world” agree because they have similar 
causal histories and similar perceptual mechanisms. In any circumstance, given 
(nearly) identical causes, one would expect (nearly) identical effects. So if the causal 
explanation for my perception of the tree is the same as that for your perception of the 
tree, then it should come as no surprise that our experiences of that tree are 
themselves similar. And this is true for the realist just as much as for the idealist. 
Someone in Istanbul and someone in Tokyo cannot directly experience the same 
                                                 
5
 I use the word ‘type’ here advisedly, as Dharmakīrti’s denial that sāmānyalakṣaṇas are ultimately 
real (because not causally efficacious) precludes him ascribing any substantial reality to types. But his 
apoha theory does, I take it, provide him with the tools necessary to make sense of a differentiation 
between actions that reveal volition and those that do not. (I thank the anonymous reviewer of this 
journal for encouraging me to be clearer on this point.) 
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tree—at least, not at the same time—and this because of their distinct causal histories, 
which have led them to be in vastly different locations. However, a person and a bat, 
if they were somehow able to communicate with one another, would be highly 
unlikely to agree in their descriptions of a tree they were both in proximity of because 
of the differences between each’s perceptual apparatus. Indeed, it does not seem 
absurd here to suggest that they may not be experiencing the same tree at all.  
Dharmakīrti insists that we need not posit the existence of the object experienced 
in order to account for intersubjective agreement. To make his point, he uses the 
example of two people with the same eye condition, both of whom think they see two 
moons. Their agreement in experience is not caused by an object that corresponds to 
and causes their experience, but by the agreement of the causal factors in their 
perception. This illustrates that there need be no external object causing the 
experiences in order for the experiencers to agree in their reports of their individual 
experiences (Dharmakīrti, 1969, Verse 65). By explaining intersubjective agreement 
without appeal to a consciousness that is qualitatively different from human 
consciousness, Dharmakīrti avoids the conclusion that Berkeley could not: that one is 
alone in the universe with God. 
An important objection can be raised against Dharmakīrti here, however. The 
example he uses, it seems, does not succeed, because even here the erroneous 
perception is caused not just by the faulty eyes, but also by the materially existent 
moon. The only proper analogy we have to what experience would be like without 
external objects to regulate it, the objection continues, is our experience of dreams. 
But in dreams there is no agreement between experiencers. One’s dream experiences 
are one’s own; within the dream there is no other experiencer, and once outside the 
dream one finds that nobody else’s experience agrees with the experience one had 
within that dream. This objection seems to strike right to the heart of Dharmakīrti’s 
argument, not just regarding intersubjective agreement but regarding the inference to 
other streams of consciousness at all: for if all our waking experience is akin to our 
dream experiences, then inferring the existence of other consciousness from the 
appearance of volitional action seems highly dubious. In dreams I frequently 
experience the representations of volitional actions that seem to have their source 
outside me. But subsequent waking experience informs me that my original 
assessment was incorrect, that those experiences were the result of no consciousness 
other than my own. And if it is possible to experience representations of a volitional 
action as caused by a consciousness other than my own when they are in fact caused 
by my own, then in no instance am I justified in inferring the existence of another 
consciousness merely from such a representation. But since the idealist cannot 
provide another account, we must conclude that idealism does in fact commit one to 
solipsism. 
Dharmakīrti is well aware of the dream objection. In fact, the bulk of the Proof is 
dedicated to refuting it. His response begins by pointing out that the realist’s account 
of dreams is no less problematic than is the idealist’s. If, as according to the realist, 
objectively experienced volitional actions within a dream do not provide a valid 
ground for inferring other consciousnesses, then neither do they in waking life. Such 
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an inference can be legitimate only if it is valid universally; if dream-experiences 
block the inference, then we can no longer say that objectively experienced volitional 
actions are a consistent mark of the existence of other minds—in the parlance of 
Indian logic, pervasion (vyapti) is lost. We are thus, according to this argument, never 
justified in inferring the existence of another mind from objectively experienced 
volitional actions, even when we are awake (Dharmakīrti, 1969, Verses 53-58).  
Dharmakīrti provides a ready response to this concern—one that is available to the 
realist and the idealist alike. He points out that the inference to another consciousness 
that occurs within a dream is valid within the dream (Dharmakīrti, 1969, Verses 83-
87). The error arises if, after we wake up, we try to carry the inference over into the 
waking world. For Dharmakīrti, the best criterion we can have for the truth of a 
cognition (jñāna) is successful action. The actual existence of the object inferred is 
thus not a necessary (or, given his idealist leanings, even a possible) condition for the 
validity of an inference. The question is, rather, whether actions that are based on that 
inference meet with success or with frustration. Given that the inferences to the 
existence of other streams of consciousness that we make within our dreams do lead 
to successful action within said dreams, the dream-inference must be taken as valid:  
 
Those inferences of other mind which are made in sleep are possible only in such a state; 
exactly thus, the attainment of aim—the conversations, etc—which take place in sleep, 
are [also] possible only at this time. But since at this time is possible such an activity as is 
not contradictory, has mutual bond and is logical, there is no inconsistency in our theory. 
(Dharmakīrti, 1969, Verse 87 Commentary)  
 
Since the inference leads to successful activity, it would be absurd to insist that we 
have no dream-experience of other consciousness simply because the marks by which 
we infer such consciousness are not present in waking experience. Given our 
successful ability to navigate the social world when awake, it is similarly absurd to 
say that we have no waking experience of other consciousness simply because the 
marks of other consciousness do not exist in the manner the realist thinks they do. 
Dharmakīrti provides another, more obscure response to the dream objection as 
well. In Verse 51 he says,  
 
In [cases of] illusions, the course of our representations is under the influence of special 
causes, the nature of which determines the content of the representations.  The 
representations may also be caused by other mind and [various] other factors, in which 
case there is sometimes an interruption in time between these factors and the 
representations; but these representations cannot appear quite independently of them. 
 
This passage is difficult to interpret, and Vinītadeva’s gloss does little to clarify, but 
one possibility is that Dharmakīrti is making the point that the mere existence of 
dreams presupposes objective experience, on which dreams are based. On this 
reading the dream-representations I experience of volitional action, while directly 
dependent on only my mental states, are indirectly dependent on the mental states of 
others—because the possibility of my presently having mental states that represent 
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another’s volitional action is dependent on my having antecedently had actual 
experience of such cases. This seems to be a plausible point for Dharmakīrti to make. 
Some support for the position can be found in studies that have indicated that 
congenitally blind people have sightless dreams, though they experience other dream-
sensations just as much as sighted people do (Kerr and Domhoff, 2004).   
These two responses, taken together, I think are sufficient to undermine the dream 
objection. But other objections remain—objections to which Dharmakīrti provides 
less thorough responses. One that strikes me as particularly powerful is this: if the 
goal of an inference is to prove that a particular event has its origin in consciousness, 
then by asserting that the event in question is a volitional act is Dharmakīrti begging 
the question? After all, if he has defined volitional actions as those having their origin 
in consciousness, then for any event under consideration it should begin as an open 
question whether that event is a volitional action. Throughout the Proof, speech is 
taken to be an inferential mark of consciousness. But a bird that can imitate human 
speech is not taken to be expressing the mental state that we would take such speech 
to indicate if uttered by a human. Why, then, assume that people’s speech indicates 
volition? 
There is an easy response to this objection, which likely explains why 
Dharmakīrti did not bother considering the objection at all. Given the idealist thesis, 
everything that we experience either has its cause in consciousness or is uncaused. 
But on the Buddhist metaphysical framework, nothing is uncaused. It follows that 
everything has its cause in consciousness. The only question, then, is whether the 
consciousness that is originary to this particular event is one’s own. But that is what 
this whole inquiry aims to answer, and thus there is no logical flaw in beginning from 
this starting point.  
This response, however, seems insufficient because it overlooks some of the 
underlying concerns behind the objection. Particularly, it does not answer the 
question of why we do not take the bird that mimics human speech to be expressing a 
volition, but we do take people to.  (Note that we take the bird to be mimicking human 
speech, not speaking.)  Relatedly, we sometimes do not hold people to be responsible 
for their speech and actions: how do we justify such an inconsistency in our 
attributions? How do I really know whether a person’s volitional actions have their 
origin in her consciousness? Fortunately, even though Dharmakīrti does not respond 
to my concern about question-begging directly, he does address the concerns that 
motivate it. 
To begin with, his Verse 51 response to the dream objection and his later response 
to the challenge that inference to other consciousness is not pramāṇa (Dharmakīrti, 
1969, Verses 66-72) remind us of the Buddhist success-criterion for truth. Starting 
from the assumption that what I experience as speech emanating from another reveals 
a consciousness within that other as cause of that speech, my ensuing activity will 
meet with either success or frustration, depending on the circumstance. Attempting to 
engage a bird in discussion meets with much more frustration than success, and 
ultimately leads me to recognize the falsity of the initial assumption. But the attempt 
to engage people in discussion, in response to what I experience as their speech, 
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generally meets with success (and, where frustration, frustration of a different sort). 
The bird’s speech we can still recognize as a mark of consciousness, however. Only, 
it is not the bird’s consciousness but rather the consciousness of the individual who 
originally spoke the words that the bird is now parroting. This example demonstrates 
Dharmakīrti’s point that a volition and the actions that result from that volition need 
not be co-locational. If I throw a stone, for instance, the flight of the stone is an 
intentional act, but one that has its origin in my consciousness. Similarly if someone 
pushes me down a flight of stairs, then my movement is the result of an intentional 
state—but not my own (Dharmakīrti, 1969, Verse 18). Thus we can see that a person 
is taken to be responsible for her actions if the conscious will that gave rise to the 
action is her own as well—that is, if she experiences the act subjectively. 
The objection is not so easily put to rest, however. R. K. Sharma has argued that, 
rather than reinforcing the inference to other minds as Dharmakīrti thinks it does, this 
admission actually renders impossible any such inference: “The invariable relation 
between consciousness and bodily behaviour now stands eviscerated of all such 
subjective conviction on which rested analogical reasoning, with the result that even 
the certainty of this relation now comes under question” (Sharma 1985, 59). In order 
to infer, by means of an analogy, your intentional state from your actions, I must 
already have established that my actions are always accompanied by my mental 
states. But if my actions can be the result of another’s will, then the universal 
association of my action with my willing does not obtain—and thus there is no 
ground for the analogy. Sharma’s challenge, then, is similar to Dharmakīrti’s 
challenge regarding the realist’s account of dreams: with pervasion lost, the inference 
is undermined. 
I noted above that Berkeley has been incorrectly interpreted as providing an 
argument by analogy to support the inference to other minds. I suspect Sharma is 
similarly misreading Dharmakīrti. To illustrate this, consider the structure of an 
argument for the existence of other minds by means of an analogy: 
 
Argument by Analogy: 
P7: My actions of a certain type have their cause in my consciousness 
P8: These actions are of that certain type 
P9: These actions do not have their cause in my consciousness 
C4: Therefore, these actions have their cause in another consciousness  
C5: Therefore, consciousnesses other than my own exist 
 
And compare this with Dharmakīrti’s Argument for the existence of other streams of 
consciousness, as articulated above: 
 
P4: I experience actions of a certain type. 
P5: Actions of this certain type have their cause in consciousness. 
P6: These actions do not have their cause in my consciousness. 
C2: Therefore, these actions have their cause in another consciousness. 
C3: Therefore, consciousnesses other than mine exist. 
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Given the similarity of the final conclusions, as well as the third premise, in the two 
arguments, it is understandable how Dharmakīrti could be read as providing an 
analogical argument. But from the differences between the first two premises of each 
argument, it should be clear that Dharmakīrti is not advocating an analogy. 
Dharmakīrti’s causal argument can best be understood, rather, as an argument by 
remainder.  
What Sharma has provided, I think, is an insightful critique of the possibility of 
establishing the existence of other minds by means of an analogy. But as a critique of 
Dharmakīrti it misses its mark. Rather than providing a reductio of Dharmakīrti’s 
argument, Sharma provides a reductio of his own claim that Dharmakīrti makes use 
of an argument by analogy. The argument by analogy relies on an action’s being 
similar to mine in order for me to infer a similar cause. But if it can be shown that 
there is a difference between my own actions and the actions that form the basis of 
the inference, then the analogy will be undermined. The argument by remainder, on 
the other hand, relies on a property of actions generally, and applies that property to 
the two cases separately. In this way, differences between the two cases under 
consideration do not undermine the inference as long as the cases still fall under the 
type. Whereas the argument by analogy takes one’s own actions to be the paradigm, 
the argument by remainder takes actions generally to be the paradigm, and recognizes 
that one’s own actions are merely a type that fall under that general category. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
Dharmakīrti’s argument for knowledge of other streams of consciousness succeeds in 
showing the realist’s objections to be incapable of refuting the idealist’s thesis. For 
each objection the realist brings to bear, the idealist is able to show that his theory 
accounts for experience as well as or better than the realist’s theory. There remains an 
objection from another camp, however, that is more difficult to respond to: the fellow 
idealist. Ratnakīrti, a successor of Dharmakīrti, argues that the idealist ought to 
embrace solipsism. Ratnakīrti accepts Dharmakīrti’s argument from constant co-
location in a way the realist cannot bring himself to.  But he then proceeds to use this 
argument against Dharmakīrti’s inference to other streams of consciousness. Just as 
blue and my awareness of blue are non-distinct, so too are your consciousness and my 
awareness of your consciousness. The idea of your mental states existing independent 
of my awareness of those mental states is unthinkable by me, in precisely the way that 
Berkeley points out that it is impossible to think of an object unthought-of. Within my 
experience there is no difference between your feeling, say, angry, and my 
representing to myself that you are angry. This being the case, what possible meaning 
can asserting knowledge of other streams of consciousness have for me, beyond being 
an assertion about my own consciousness—and thus not about other streams of 
consciousness after all? 
This seems to me an exceedingly difficult challenge for Dharmakīrti to respond 
to. One possibility is that he could abandon his own argument for idealism, and make 
use instead of Vasubandhu’s and Dignāga’s arguments (though these are not without 
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their own detractors). As Arindam Chakrabarti (1990) points out, there exist a number 
of sophisticated responses to the argument from constant co-location. 
A less unpalatable response for Dharmakīrti may be to claim that the inference to 
other streams of consciousness provides content for the assertion that not all of my 
states of awareness are up to me. This may reduce ultimately to an assertion about my 
own mental states, but it is a different sort of assertion about my mental states—that 
they have their cause in something outside me, something that is beyond the grasp of 
perceptual awareness, and only indirectly within the grasp of inferential awareness. I 
take this approach to be the most promising way not just for Dharmakīrti, but for 
idealists more generally to respond to Ratnakīrti’s objection. This is important 
because, while the objection itself may originate in medieval India, it is relevant to 
anyone who wants to advocate idealism, regardless of temporal or geographic 
circumstance. 
There is a caveat attached to this move, however: it brings one dangerously close 
to Berkeley’s position of inferring a qualitatively different sort of mind, the position 
that led him to the consequence that Dharmakīrti’s idealism has heretofore been able 
to avoid. But if the idealist remains faithful to Dharmakīrti’s causal account of 
experience and of intersubjective agreement, and does not concern herself overmuch 
with the nature of the mental cause that is just beyond one’s grasp, she may be able to 
avoid the untoward consequence. 
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